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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from the decision of the Board
of Review of the Industrial Commission of the
Utah Department of Employment Security.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF 35-4-5(e) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT

SECURITY ACT SHOULD 3E INTERPRETED AS GIVING THE BOARD DISCRETION
TO IMPOSE RESTITUTION AND A CIVIL PENALTY OF AN AMOUNT UP TO BUT
NOT TO EXCEED THE BENEFITS THE CLAIMANT RECEIVED BY DIRECT REASON
OF HIS FRAUD.
II.

THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS NOT SUPPORTED BY

THE EXIDENCE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Claimant - Appellant Roger H. Mattson ( hereafter
"claimant") filed an initial claim for unemployment insurance
benefits effective January 27, 1985.
to $186.00.

His weekly benefit amounted

Claimant filed claims for benefits each week between

January 27 and August 3, 1985.

R. 63. It is the weeks ending

February 2, February 23, March 16 through April 13, May 11 through
May 25, and June 15 through July 12, 1985 which are the subject of
this appeal.
As a result of the information contained on the claim
cards, he received waiting week credit for the calender week ended
February 2, 1985 and $2604 in unemployment benefits for the weeks
ended February 23, March 16 through April 13, May 11 through May 2 5
and June 15 through July 13, 1985.

R. 59.

Information subsequently received showed the claimant had
provided services as an independent contractor, as a consulting
engineer beginning January 7, 1985.

The claimant accepted

contracts with R. A. Wilson as shown on the table below.

R. 54

The table reflects the contract number, the beginning and ending
dates, of the contract, the amount paid to the claimant (excluding
travel) and the date paid.
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Sub-Contract
0083-0001
01
03
05
06
10
11
13
20
23
25
28

Beginning
Date
1-07-85
1-14-85
1-31-85
2-12-85
3-14-85
4-02-85
5-08-85
5-07-85
6-14-85
6-14-85
6-28-85

Ending
Date
1-17-85
1-31-85
2-15-85
2-25-85
3-30-85
4-15-85
5-23-85
5-31-85
6-24-86
6-24-85
7-15-85

Amount Paid
(Exc. Travel)
$352.00
495.00
308.00
275.00
330.00
308.00
704.00
176.00
176.00
176.00
440.00

Date
Paid
3-05-85
2-05-85
3-05-85
3-05-85
4-05-85
5-05-85
6-14-85
6-14-85
7-03-85
7-03-85
8-01-85

Due to the apparent discrepany between information submitted
by the claimant on his claims and that submitted by his employer,
a hearing was held by a Hearings Officer on October 2, 1985.

On

advice of his attorney, claimant did not testify or offer any information regarding the issues at hand.

The Hearings Officer issued a

decision on October 11, 1985 denying employment insurance benefits
for the calendar weeks ended February 2, February 23, March 16 through
April 13, May 11 through June 1, June 22, July 13, 1985 and for 49
additional weeks commencing October 13, 1985 and ending September 20,
1986, on the grounds the claimant knowingly withheld material information in order to receive unemployment insurance benefits to which
he was not entitled.

This decision created an overpayment in the amount

of $2,511.00 plus the Hearings Officerlevied a civil penalty in the
like amount which the claimant was held liable to repay.
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On October 18, 1985 claimant filed an appeal to the Appeals
Tribunal from the decision of the Hearings Officer.

A hearing was

held on November 13, 1985 by an Administrative Law Judge.

Based on

the testimoney and documents entered into the record, the ALJ issued a
decision on February 28, 1986 modifying the decison of the Hearings
Officer by increasing the overpayment and civil penalties up to $5,394.
R. 81, 82, 83, 84
On March 10, 1986 the claimant filed an appeal to the Board
of Review from the decision of the ALJ.

On April 4, 1986 the Board

of Review affirmed the decision of the ALJ.

R. 90

The claimant filed a Petition for Writ of Review with the
Utah Supreme Court on April 22, 1986.

On August 27, 1986 ,

Attorney for claimant, submitted a letter to the Department of
Employment Security requesting reconsideration by the Board of
Review,

R. 94
On September 26, 1986 the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the

claimant's appeal to the Court on the grounds the claimant failed to
proosecute his appeal.
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Sometime in February 1990, claimant's request for reconsideration was brought to the attention of the Attorney for the Board of
Review.

On March 6, 1990 the matter was returned to the Board of

Review to consider the contentions raised by claimant's attorney.
On March 8, 1990 the Board of Review issued a decision reaffirming
its previous decision which adopted the ALJ ! s decision.

R. 96, 97

On April 6, 1990 claimant filed a Petition for Writ of
Review with the Utah Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF 35-4-5(e) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY ACT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS GIVING THE BOARD DISCRETION
tO IMPOSE RESTITUTION AND A CIVIL PENALTY OF AN AMOUNT UP TO
BUT NOT TO EXCEED AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE BENEFITS THE CLAIMANT
RECEIVED BY DIRECT REASON OF HIS FRAUD.
The statute provides:
"Each individual found in violation of this subsection shall
repay to the Commission the amount of benefits the claimant
actually received, and, as a civil penalty, an amount equal
to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of
his fraud."
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The present law as enumerated by DiPrizio vs Industrial
Commission Board of Review

572.2d 679 (1977) and relying on

Decker vs. Industrial Commission 533 P 2d 898 (1975) is that the
statute is mandatory.

By the use of the word "shall" whenever fraud

is shown the administrative judge is compelled in addition to restitution to levy a civil penalty (punitive damages) of an amount equal
to the benefits received.
It is the position of the petitioner that the Decker case
and the DiPrizio cases are bad law and should be overruled.
Decker case was a unanimous decision made in 1975.

The

By 1977 when

DiPrizio was written, two out of five Utah Supreme Court justices
were in favor of overruling Decker.

It is submitted that the

justices of the present court might very well, thirteen years later,
find it in their minds and hearts to cast their votes for more
justice for the employee and more latitute and discretion for the
administrative agency within guidelines of an upper limit as
imposed by the

statute.
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The Board is entitled to discretion.
compelled to go all or nothing.

They should not be

The administrative judges should

be allowed within certain limits to act as judges and not merely
fact finders.

If at all possible, the statute should be interpreted

as defining these limits rather than dictating the fine.
In looking at the Decker and DiPrizio cases, we see that
the judge stated that the verb "shall1' makes the wording mandatory and opted to use this rule of statutory construction rather
than several other available statutory construction rules.
effect, the the Court took the easy way out.

In

They could have used

a concept based on seeking the legislative intent based upon interpreting the statute to harmonize with the purpose of the act, etc.
It is submitted that in the DiPrizio case there are flaws even in the
mandatory use of the word "shall.1'

In reading the statute, one sees

tne words "'shall repay1 to the Commission the amount of the benefits
actually received."

However, when it comes to the second half of the

sentence the words "shall repay" are not used; no verb at all is used.
It states "as a civil penalty, an amount equal to the benefits received
by direct reason of his fraud." We have to assume that the verb for the
second half of the sentence is "shall repay."
would dictate this.

Diagraming the sentence

However, one might ask, "How can you repay monies

that were not ever paid out?"

Diagraming the sentence and adding the

assumed verb "siiall repay" just makes no sense.
read words into and out of the statute,

As long as we have to

why not read the

not to exceed" rather than "shall" or "shall repay?"
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reasoned dissent

^joined in by Judge

.ooe
Maugham,

stated:
"The Commission appears to have acted under the impression
that the quoted statute makes it mandatory to impose the
full penalty . , . . . A general rule of construction of
statutes is that they should be so interpreted and applied
as to harmonize with the purposes of the act of which they
are a part. I do not see how that objective is accomplished
by applying the section \ inder scrutiny in an absolute and
arbitrary manner , , ,
Under that arbitrary view, the
maximum penalty is mandated regardless of the amount,, or the
i lumber of v i o l a t i o n s , or the actual loss by the State
Unemployment Compensation, Fund . ,
, . It is therefore
obvious that in some circumstances the a r b i t r a r y and
u n r e a s o n a b l e imposition of the maximum penalties has not
only the potential for harshness and injustice, but it can
defeat rather than carry out the purposes of the act
....
Correlated to what has been said above about the
desirability and propriety of so construing a statute as to
give effect to its intent and p u r p o s e , there is the further
rule relating to construction of statutes w h i c h confer
powers on a governmental entity: that they give not only the
authori ty expressly granted, but that w h i c h is im.pl i ed as
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reasonably necessary to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed upon such entities. It is an elemental
concept of law that some exercise of discretion, when
imposing statutory penalties, is necessary to achieve individualized justice. This is especially true when sanctions
and penalties are applied by administrative agencies, when
the power is conferred upon such agencies to investigate
facts, weigh evidence and draw conclusionsas a basis for
legal actions. Due to the nature of the responsibilities
imposed upon the Commission in administering and carrying
out the purposes of the act, it ie required to perform some
functions of a judicial nature. Being thus invested with
judicial powers, there should be necessarily implied therein
the authority to exercise the judicial prerogative of acting
in a reasonable and judicious manner in order to properly
administer the act and accomplish its purposes.
Accordingly, it should not be considered as invariable and
mandatory that the maximum penalties prescribed by the
statute be imposed. But in exigent circumstances, where the
imposition of such maximum penalties would result in an arbitrary and unreasonable injustice, as well as tending to
defeat rather than carry out the purposes of the Act, the
Commission should have the power to modify or suspend the
imposition of such penalties, or the time and manner of
reimbursement required, as the purposes of the Act and
interest of justice may require.
This Court should interpret the statute in such a way
as to:

Give the Commission more power to be able to modify or

suspend imposition of penalties within the limits set by the
statute as the purpose of the act and interest of justice may
require.

It is submitted that if thhe Court does so, it may or

may not change the penalties levied in this particular case
against the petitioner but it would make those penalties fairer,
more reasonable and more judicious.
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In reality, the very essence of an independent contractor is that
he controls his own time, works when he desires and only he knows
when.

His own testimoney as to when is the most credible evidence

on the subject and cannot be overridden by an assumption which is
only valid under an employer/employee relationship.
It is submitted that the evidence shows claimant owes
$1,116.00 plus civil penalties and not $5,394.00 including civil
penalties.
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